Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 12
Issue 3 Summer 1979

Article 6

1979

Recent Decisions
Gayle B. Carlson
Michael P. Coury
Celia J. Collins
Spencer M. Sax

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gayle B. Carlson, Michael P. Coury, Celia J. Collins, and Spencer M. Sax, Recent Decisions, 12 Vanderbilt
Law Review 757 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol12/iss3/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-AcT

OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES
NOT PRECLUDE ADJUDICATION OF ANTITRUST CLAIM INVOLVING
ALLEGED FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT OF FOREIGN PATENTS

I. FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff,' a United States manufacturer of embossed vinyl flooring and a licensee of defendant's 2 United States patents 3 brought

an antitrust suit against defendant for alleged anticompetitive activities' occurring in foreign countries. Plaintiff asserted that defendant had made representations 5 that would be fraudulent under
United States law in order to obtain foreign patents. According to
plaintiff, these foreign patents violated United States antitrust law
because the fraudulent procurement of patents may constitute an
antitrust violation under § 2 of the Sherman Act if the other sub1.
2.

Mannington Mills, Inc.
Congoleum Corporation.

3. Defendant holds patents on chemically embossed vinyl flooring in twentysix foreign countries. Plaintiff previously claimed similar rights under defendant's
foreign patents; however, the court ruled against such rights in a companion case.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Industries, Inc., 197 U.S. Pat. Q. 145
(D.N.J. 1977). Subsequently, defendant filed patent infringement suits against
plaintiff in Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand.
4. The plaintiff claims that defendant's licensing practices in foreign markets
violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), which provides
the following:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, or monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
5. Plaintiff's complaint listed four general categories of fraudulent representations:
1. False statements about the reactions and performance of some of the
chemical components of the vinyl flooring;
2. Misrepresentation of test data;
3. Suppression of information critical to the practice of the invention;
4. Misleading statements about the status and contents of the United
States patent applications.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979).
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stantive elements of the violation are present.' Plaintiff claimed
that defendant's enforcement of the foreign patents both restricted
the foreign export business of plaintiff and other United States
competitors and demonstrated defendant's intent to monopolize.7
Defendant, claiming that the act of state doctrine prohibited the
court from enjoining defendant's enforcement of foreign patents in
other countries, brought a motion to dismiss.8 The United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the validity of foreign patents must
be determined by the courts of the issuing countries and that
United States persons need not apply for foreign patents in a manner other than required by foreign law.' On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, reversed and remanded.' 0 Held: The
issuance of patents by a foreign government is a ministerial activity that does not concern the executive branch in its conduct of
foreign relations and does not force defendant to exclude plaintiff
from foreign markets; therefore, neither the act of state doctrine
nor its correlative, foreign compulsion, bars the court's consideration of the antitrust claim. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
]I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Underhill v. Hernandez" provides the classical statement of the
act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.2
6. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965). See also note 4 supra.
7. 595 F.2d at 1298. In addition, plaintiff brought a treaty violation claim and
a pendent state unfair competition claim.
8. Defendant also claimed that no relief could be granted on the alleged treaty
violations since the treaties established no private right of action. Additionally,
defendant requested dismissal of the state claim for lack of a federal question if

the court dismissed the other two claims.
9. 595 F.2d at 1290.
10. The instant court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the treaty
violation claim but reversed the dismissal of the pendent state claim.
11. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
12. Id. at 252.
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The act of state doctrine does not operate to deprive a court of
jurisdiction, 13 instead, it only requires that a court refrain from
questioning the validity of a sovereign's acts.' 4 Thus, the United
States court applies the foreign state's law as a rule of decision and
considers the sovereign's act valid under that nation's law.' 5 Courts

based the act of state doctrine on two different theories. The earlier
cases explained the doctrine in terms of preservation of international comity,"8 while the more recent cases emphasized separation
of powers among the branches of federal government.' 7 The earliest
application of the act of state doctrine in an antitrust case is found
in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.'8 In that case plaintiff
claimed that defendant attempted to monopolize the banana trade
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In carrying out this
purpose, defendant allegedly induced the Costa Rican government
to seize part of plaintiff's operations within its country. The Supreme Court held that the appropriation was an act by a foregn
sovereign accomplished within its borders and, although allegedly
induced by defendant, was not within the scope of the Sherman
Act. 9 The Court stated "that it is a contradiction in terms to say
that within [the foreign power's] jurisdiction it is unlawful to
persuade a foreign power to bring about a result that it declares
by its conduct to be desirable and proper .

. .

. [The sovereign]

makes the persuasion lawful by its own act."' , Although later cases
have not overruled American Banana, they have limited its scope;
it is now clear that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially. 2' In
See Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
14. Note, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77
COL. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (1977).
13.

15. Id. n.36.
16. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1819); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In Oetien, the court states:
"The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another. . . rests at last upon the highest
considerations of international comity and expediency." 246 U.S. at 303-04.
17. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court stated that neither international law nor the
United States Constitution required application of the doctrine but that its necessity was derived from "the basic relationships between branches of government
in a system of separation of powers." Id. at 421, 423.
18. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
19. Id. at 357.
20. Id. at 358.
21. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
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United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 2 plaintiff challenged favorable
discriminatory laws that defendants had secured from the Mexican and Yucatan governments in furtherance of an alleged combination and conspiracy to monopolize the importation and sale of
sisal in the United States. The Court held that the American
Banana doctrine did not control Sisal Sales because the parties
entered into the conspiracy within the United States and effectuated it by acts done therein, not merely by acts of a foreign
government instigated by defendants. 23 The Supreme Court again
refused to apply the American Banana holding in Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 2'in which plaintiff alleged
that defendants had conspired to monopolize trade in ferrovanadium and vanadium oxide in violation of the Sherman Act. One
defendant's wholly owned Canadian subsidiary had been appointed by the Canadian government as its exclusive wartime
agent for purchasing and allocating vanadium for industries in
Canada. Plaintiff claimed that this defendant had violated antitrust law by influencing its subsidiary to facilitate the conspiracy
by eliminating plaintiff from the Canadian ferrovanadium market.
The liability of the Canadian government's agent was not at issue
since the subsidiary was not a party. 25 The court held that the
Canadian law permitting the subsidiary's acts did not provide a
defense since, the subsidiary's acts were not approved or required
by the Canadian government.26 Similarly, United States v. The
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,"7 in which
Swiss legislation aided an alleged conspiracy by Swiss and American watchmakers to restrain trade, held that the foreign government's approval did not shield defendants from liability. Although
the court did not discuss the act of state doctrine, it stated that
only "direct foreign governmental action compelling the defen-

984 (1977); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
22. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
23. Id. at 275-76.
24. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
25. The court examined the relationship between the acts of defendant and
the foreign government and determined that these acts were distinguishable. Id.
26. Id. at 706-07. "There is nothing to indicate that such law in any way
compelled discriminatory purchasing, and it is well settled that acts which are

in themselves legal lose that character when they become constituent elements
of an unlawful scheme." Id. at 707.
27. 1963 Trade Cases 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade
Cases

70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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dants' activities" could deprive the court of jurisdiction. In contrast, the district court in InteramericanRefining Corporation v.
Texas Maracaibo,Inc. 9 found that defendants' alleged antitrust
violations resulted from real compulsion by the foreign government."0 Plaintiff claimed that even if compulsion is a defense in an
antitrust case, the compulsion must be valid under the foreign
nation's law. The court, however, applied the act of state doctrine
and refused to inquire into the validity of the government action
under Venezuelan law. 31 In another antitrust suit, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,3 2 the court also invoked the

doctrine. In Occidental,plaintiff alleged that defendants had conspired with Great Britain, Iran, and two Trucial States3 to deprive
plaintiff of the richest part of its offshore oil concession from one
of the Trucial States. 34 The court found that the act of state doctrine precluded adjudication because it would have been necessary

to inquire into the validity of the foreign state's decree. 35 Con28. Id. at 77,457.
29. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). Plaintiff, a United States company,
claimed that its United States suppliers of Venezuelan oil had engaged in a
boycott prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Defendants complied with
the Venezuelan government's prohibition of the sale of Venezuelan oil to plaintiff.
The government imposed this ban because two of plaintiff's officials were Venezuelan citizens who opposed the government in power.
30. After discussing the Sisal Sales and Continental Ore cases, the court
stated: "Nothing in the materials before the Court indicates that defendants
either procured the Venezuelan order or that they acted voluntarily pursuant to
a delegation of authority to control the oil industry. The narrow question for
decision is the availability of genuine compulsion by a foreign sovereign as defense." Id. at 1297.
31. In finding the doctrine applicable in antitrust cases, the court noted: "The
reasons of policy which support the doctrine would hardly be served by limiting
it to acts of expropriation." Id. at 1299.
32. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
33. Trucial State Sharjah and Trucial State Umm al Qaywayn.
34. Umm al Qaywayn.
35. Plaintiff contended that this doctrine was no longer valid after the Sabbatino Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(3)(2) (1976), which Congress passed after the
Sabbatino decision. The court stated: "In intent and in actual effect, then, the
statute 'reverses'-in the absence of a request by the executive-the specific
holding of the Sabbatino case . . . ." 331 F. Supp. at 111. Sabbatino held that
the courts would not examine the validity of a United States-recognized foreign
government's expropriation of property within its own territory in the absence of
a treaty, even if the complaint alleges a violation of customary international law.
376 U.S. at 428. The Occidental court further stated:
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versely, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America," the
Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's dismissal that had been
based on the act of state doctrine. The court found that the Honduran court order, allegedly obtained by defendants in furtherance
of their attempt to control the Honduran lumber trade,17 was not
significant to invoke the act of state doctrine. In deciding whether
to apply antitrust laws when the acts of a foreign sovereign were
involved, the court weighed the United States' interests in enforcing its antitrust laws against foreign policy interests.3 The Second
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in the antitrust suit of
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.10 In Hunt, plaintiff, an independent oil
producer, claimed that the seven major oil companies had conspired to protect their Persian Gulf fields by sacrificing their Libyan oil holdings. As a result of an agreement between the parties,
plaintiff claimed that defendants' actions placed him in a difficult
bargaining position with Libya that provoked nationalization of
his assets by that government.' Because the court would have had
to rule on the motivation behind Libya's nationalization of plainCongress has thus legislated a judicial 'presumption' with respect to the
foreign relations demands of a limited category of act of state cases....
In any event, this exception is by its terms extremely narrow, and in all
other cases the act of state doctrine remains the law of the land.
331 F. Supp. at 112.
36. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
37. In enforcing claims against plaintiff's Honduran predecessor, defendants
obtained court ordered embargoes on property of plaintiffs Honduran subsidiaries. The Honduran court appointed an interventor to prevent diminution of the
embargoed property, and plaintiff claimed that this interventor was on the payroll of one of the defendants. Id. at 604-05.
38. The court states as follows: "It is apparent that the doctrine does not
bestow a blank-check immunity upon all conduct blessed with some imprimatur
of a foreign government." Id. at 606.
39. The factors considered by the court in this balancing process included the
following:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance
of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of the corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States
as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
40. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
41. Id. at 76-78.
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tiffs oil fields, the court held that "the political act complained
of here was clearly within the act of state doctrine and . . . the
claim is non-justiciable. 4 2 Thus, there is a split of opinion concerning the applicability of the act of state doctrine in antitrust
cases.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The Third Circuit held that it had subject matter jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act since the defendant's actions abroad had
a substantial effect on United States foreign commerce. The litigation involved two United States corporations contesting alleged
foreign antitrust activity that harmed the export business of one
of the corporations; thus, the court found a sufficient effect in the
United States.43 The court then addressed the act of state doctrine,
holding that it did not bar adjudication of plaintiff's claims. The
instant court cautioned that preclusion of a claim should not be
imposed lightly. In reaching its conclusion that the act of state
doctrine was inapplicable, the court stated that it must analyze
the nature of the conduct in question and the effect on the parties,
in addition to determining the sovereign's role. The court noted a
difference between the confiscation cases, in which the act of state
doctrine was first applied, and antitrust cases, finding that the
latter involved a public interest as well as private rights. Next, the
court distinguished real compulsion by a foreign sovereign" from
both a party's solicitation of governmental activity45 and mere gov42.

Id. at 73.

43. The court relied upon the "intended effects" test:
In oft-quoted language, Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945), concluded
that although Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to prohibit conduct
having no effect in the United States, it did intend the Act to reach conduct
having consequences within this country-even where the parties concerned
had no allegiance to the United States-if the conduct is intended to and
actually does have an effect upon United States imports or exports. This
wide-reaching "intended effects" test has been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir.
1979).
44. See the previous discussion of the Interamerican Refining Corp. litigation,
notes 29-31 & accompanying text supra.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See also
notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
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ernmental approval,46 holding only the former to be a defense in
an antitrust suit. Examining the issuance of patents by foreign
governments, the court found that these sovereigns did not require
defendant to exclude plaintiff from the foreign markets. The court
also stated that this case did not fall within the more traditional
applications of the act of state doctrine because the granting of
patents would not concern the executive branch in conducting
foreign relations. The granting of patents for floor coverings is a
ministerial activity, which is not the type of sovereign action comtemplated by either the act of state doctrine or foreign compulsion. " Next, the court addressed the question of whether jurisdic-

tion should be exercised. In addressing this issue, the court considered the direct and ripple effects that a judgment against defendant would have abroad. In its analysis, the court in the instant
case applied a balancing process similar to that in Timberlane
Lumber Co.4" The instant court, however, established a slightly
modified list of factors 9 to be considered. Since the record was
46. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690 (1962). See also notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
47. The instant court distinguishes between the act of state doctrine and
foreign compulsion, describing the latter as a correlative of the former. See also
Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 606. One author in this field describes
foreign government compulsion as an offshoot of the act of state doctrine, although it developed independently. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANITRUST LAWS 82 (1973). Although the two concepts both involve actions of a foreign
government, there is a valid distinction. Under the act of state doctrine the
defendant is not liable because the government committed the act alleged to be
illegal. In comparison, the defendant is not liable under the foreign compulsion
defense because the foreign government forced the defendant to commit the allegedly illegal act. Sovereign Compulsion Defense in Antitrust Litigation:New Life
for the Act of State Doctrine?,PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTEmATIONAL LAW 100 (1978). The foreign compulsion defense also is related to the state
action defense in domestic antitrust cases. Id.; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943).
48. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra. The instant court stated
that it was in substantial agreement with the Timberlane case.
49. Among the factors to be considered are the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy, the nationality of the parties, the relative importance of the alleged
violation of conduct here compared to that abroad, the availability of a remedy
abroad and the pendency of litigation there, the existence of intent to harm or
affect American commerce and its foreseeability, and the possible effect upon
foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief. Additionally,
the court considered the following: whether a party will be placed in the position
of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting
requirements by both countries if relief is granted; whether the court can make
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factually insufficient to permit an application of these factors, the

Third Circuit remanded the case to district court for further proceedings.
IV.

COMMENT

The trend in antitrust cases, as in other areas of law, is toward
a more limited application of the act of state doctrine. The mere
fact that a foreign government is involved in the acts complained
of does not create immunity for defendants in antitrust suits.
Through the instant decision, the Third Circuit joined the Ninth
Circuit" in the development of a rational means of applying antitrust law to cases involving acts of foreign countries. The instant
court applied the following three-part analysis: (1) whether the
court has subject matter jurisdiction; (2) whether the act of state
doctrine is applicable to preclude adjudication; and (3) whether
there are other considerations to influence the court's decision to
exercise jurisdiction. The court, however, limited its use of the act
of state doctrine and the foreign compulsion defense. By applying
the above analysis, the court separates the act of state doctrine
from a decision not to adjudicate based upon policy considerations.
Thus, a court using this approach would address the act of state
issue but would refuse to adjudicate only if the foreign sovereign's
act is significant in international relations: a court would not apply
the act of state doctrine to ministerial or minor acts of the foreign
sovereign. If a court concludes that the doctrine is not controlling,
it will then balance the competing antitrust and foreign interests.
Although the three circuits 51 that recently considered the act of
state doctrine in antitrust cases reached different results concerning the applicability of the doctrine, the inconsistency may be
more apparent than real. In Hunt, the Second Circuit refused to
examine the foreign sovereign's motivation for nationalizing the

its order effective; whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country
if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and whether a treaty
with the affected nations has addressed the issue. Mannington Mills, Inc., 595
F.2d at 1297-1298. Cf., Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614. The concurring
opinion disagrees with the application of a balancing process at the jurisdictional
stage, preferring to consider such factors when fashioning a remedy. 595 F.2d at
1303.
50. Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 597.
51. The three circuits are as follows: (1) the Second Circuit in Hunt, (2) the
Third Circuit in the instant case, and (3) the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane.
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plaintiff's assets.2 The court applied the act of state doctrine and
did not use the ad hoc weighing process developed by the Third
and Ninth 3 Circuits. In both the instant case and Timberlane,
however, the courts first found that the acts 4 of the sovereigns were
relatively insignificant55 and then applied the weighing process.
Although Hunt did not inquire int6 the foreign government's motivation, it found that both the United States and Libyan governments considered the action political. 6 Thus, application of the
instant court's analysis to Hunt would probably have yielded the
same result5 since in the second step of the analysis the court
addresses the significance of the sovereign's act. If the acts are
significant, as in Hunt, the court applies the doctrine, thereby
never reaching the final step. Such a three-part analysis provides
a clearer explanation of the court's decision and a workable approach to the sensitive area of antitrust cases involving foreign
sovereigns' acts. Through this balancing process, the court may
still limit its jurisdiction without distorting the act of state doctrine.
Gayle B. Carlson
52. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
53. The Ninth Circuit bases its "evaluation and balancing of the relevant
considerations in each case" on the Supreme Court's approach in Continental
Ore. Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614.
54. The issuance of patents and a court order, respectively, were the acts
involved.
55. See notes 36-39, 48 and accompanying text supra.
56. 550 F.2d at 73.
57.

See Note, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns,

supra note 14, at 1264.

ADMIRALTY-DAMAGES

FOR WRONGFUL DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS
ARE LIMITED TO PECUNIARY Loss

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs, widows of decedents killed when defendant's helicopter crashed on the high seas en route from defendant's offshore oil
drilling platform, brought a wrongful death action in their representative capacities, alleging defendant's negligence. Plaintiffs
sought damages for pecuniary loss under the Death on High Seas
Act (DOHSA)' and damages for loss of society under general maritime law.2 The district court, accepting admiralty jurisdiction,3
found defendant negligent and awarded pecuniary damages.' The
court computed loss of society for two of the plaintiffs at $100,000
and $155,000 respectively but held that such loss was not compensable under law.5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiffs were entitled to claim damages for loss of society
under general maritime law.' On certiorari to the Supreme Court,
reversed. Held: The measure of damages in an action for wrongful
death on the high seas is limited to pecuniary loss by DOHSA and
thus damages for loss of society under general maritime law cannot
be recovered. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618
(1978).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

In The Harrisburg,the Supreme Court held that no federal
wrongful death action existed under general maritime law. Recovery for death could be based only on state or federal wrongful death
statutes.' Thereafter, all actions for wrongful death occurring at
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976).
2. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164, 1174 (W.D. La. 1973).
3. Admiralty jurisdiction was based on the conclusion that Mobil's helicopter
was the functional equivalent of a crewboat. Id. at 1167.
4. The two families' pecuniary losses were valued at $362,297 and $163,400
respectively. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 360 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. La.
1973).
5. Id. at 1144-48, 1150. The district court's holding that loss of society was not
compensable was rendered prior to Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S.
573 (1974), which allowed recovery for loss of society in a general maritime wrongful death action.
6. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977).
7. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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sea were based on state statutes.' In 1920, Congress passed
DOHSA, which created an action for any death "caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State, . . . [Territory or
dependency]."' Damages under DOHSA were limited to pecuniary loss.' 0 Since DOHSA applied only to the high seas, recovery for
death in territorial waters was still governed by state statutes. In
1970, a unanimous Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburgin
Moragne v. State Marine Lines" and held that there was a federal
remedy for wrongful death under the general maritime law.' 2 The
Court stated that the creation of a federal remedy would promote
uniformity of federal admiralty law by eliminating "discrepancies
that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive coricepts.' ' The
Court rejected a contention that'DOHSA manifested a congressional intent to preclude a federal remedy in territorial waters. The

Court found that Congress had not intended DOHSA to
"foreclos[e] any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be
found appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime
law."" While Moragne involved a death in territorial waters, the
8. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADmIRALTY 359 (2d ed. 1975); see
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
9. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). Section 761 authorizes "a suit for damages in the
district courts of the United States, in admiralty ....

."

This has been inter-

preted as giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over DOHSA suits. See Devlin v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
10. "The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought
..... " 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976).

11. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
12. Id. at 409. After a historical analysis of the reasoning behind The
Harrisburg,the Court concluded that The Harrisburg"rested on a most dubious
foundation when announced, has become an increasingly unjustifiable anomaly
as the law over the years has left it behind ....

."

Id. at 404.

13. Id. at 401. Specifically, the Court cited three anomalies that existed under
the law at that time: (1) under some state statutes, conduct which violated federal
law created liability for injuries but not for death; (2) claims based on unseaworthiness were remedied under DOHSA but not under state statutes which excluded
unseaworthiness claims (thus creating a discrepancy in remedies based on
whether a decedent died on the high seas or in territorial waters); (3) under some
state statutes, seamen were denied remedy for unseaworthiness within territorial
waters while longshoremen had a remedy for unseaworthiness based on the same
statute. Id. at 395-96.
14. Id. at 400. See H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1920); S.REP.
No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1919).
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Moragne court did not imply that the newly created federal remedy was limited to territorial waters. Moragne left the issue of
measuring damages under the new remedy to be resolved by lower
courts. 5 In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,"1a divided Supreme
Court resolved the issue of damages by holding that plaintiffs in a
Moragne type action could recover damages for pecuniary loss, loss
of society and funeral expenses. 17 By allowing damages for loss of
society, the Court aligned the maritime wrongful death remedy
with a majority of state wrongful death statutes." Like Moragne,
Gaudet involved an accident in territorial waters. Yet the site of
the accident did not appear to be relevant to the Court's analysis.
In fact, the Gaudet majority inferred that a Moragne action could
extend to the high seas and supplement the remedy provided by
DOHSA. 9 The applicability of Moragne to the high seas was subsequently considered by the lower courts and resulted in disagreement among the First and Fifth Circuits. In Barbe v. Drummond,"'
the First Circuit held that funeral expenses were not compensable
in an action for wrongful death on the high seas. The court recognized that Gaudet allowed recovery of funeral expenses in a
Moragne action but held that the pecuniary loss standard of
DOHSA controlled on the high seas. 2' The court reasoned that
Moragne was intended to provide an action where one did not
previously exist, i.e., in territorial waters, and not to supplement
15. 398 U.S. at 408.
16. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
17. Id. at 584.
18. Id. at 580-81. The dissent argued that since DOSHA and the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 et seq. (1976) (allowing seamen to sue shipowners in negligence),
allow only pecuniary loss, those acts should be the model for damages allowed in
a Moragne action. The dissent cited with approval lower court cases which had
limited Moragne damages to pecuniary loss. Id. at 606-07 (Powell, J., dissenting);
see, e.g., Petition of Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
19. After citing Moragne's interpretation of DOHSA as not "foreclosing any
nonstatutory federal remedies," the Gaudet majority stated that "[n]othing in
the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress intended the Act's statutory measure of damages to pre-empt any additional elements of damages for a
maritime wrongful death remedy which this Court might deem 'appropriate to
effectuate the policies of general maritime law."' 414 U.S. at 588 n.22.
20. 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
21. Id. at 801. Although DOHSA does not allow recovery for pain and suffering
by the decedent, the Barbe court allowed such recovery by holding that there was
a federal survival action under general maritime law which allowed recovery for
pain and suffering without conflicting with DOHSA. Id. at 799-800.
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DOHSA which already provided a remedy on the high seas. 2 Accordingly, the court refused to ignore the pecuniary loss limitation
of DOHSA in order to allow recovery under general maritime law.2
In Law v. Sea Drilling Corp.,"4 the Fifth Circuit rejected Barbe and
held that a Moragne action was available for death on any navigable waters.2 Noting that the Gaudet majority placed no emphasis
on the waters where death occurred, the Fifth Circuit took the
expansive view that Gaudet had "abrogated the pecuniary loss
standard of DOHSA. ' ' 21 The court felt that failure to extend
Moragne to the high seas would create discrepancies in recovery
which Moragne was intended to eliminate. Specifically, the court
noted that a possible discrepancy would arise if a plaintiff should
elect a common law remedy in lieu of admiralty jurisdiction, as
permitted by the Savings to Suitors Clause.2 7 In order to resolve
the disagreement between the Circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the instant case.
22. Id. at 801.
23. Id.
24. 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975).
25. Id. at 797-98.
26. Id. at 796. The Court also drew support from GLMoRE & BLACK:
The Moragne remedy covers deaths within territorial waters as well as
deaths on the high seas ....

[U]nder Gaudet, indeed, all the state stat-

utes seem to have joined the federal statutes on the scrap heap. The maritime law death remedy, as explicated in Gaudet, is now more comprehensive and provides for a greater recovery than had previously been available
under the federal death statutes or under most state death statutes. Id. at
796 (G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 368-70).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976), provides that: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of
admiralty jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled."
The court in Law stated as follows:
Under the Barbe holding a claimant under substantive maritime law who
brought suit at law .

.

. under the Savings to Suitors Clause would be

entitled to the full panoply of recovery under Moragne while those unfortunates who could not meet the requisites of diversity jurisdiction or get persnonal jurisdiction in either the state or federal court, would be restricted
to the DOHSA pecuniary loss. This is because, as Mr. Justice Harlan suggested in Moragne, the widely assumed exclusivity of DOHSA does not
mean that it is the only remedy..What it does mean is that DOHSA suits
must be brought in admiralty-"a suit for damages in the district court of
the United States, in admiralty ....

."

523 F.2d at 796-97.
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II.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its
opinion in Gaudet had not placed any emphasis on the waters in
which death occurred." The Court concluded, however, that the
Gaudet holding was applicable only to territorial waters." The
Court stated that damages on the high seas were limited to the
pecuniary losses allowed by DOHSA.30 The Court rejected the arguments that admiralty courts were free to supplement maritime
statutes and that it was necessary to supplement DOHSA in order
to preserve the uniformity of maritime law.31 In addition, the Court
reasoned that making DOHSA the exclusive remedy on the high
seas posed little threat to uniformity. 2 The Court stated, however,
that even if damages differed greatly between territorial waters
and the high seas, DOHSA could not be ignored for uniformity's
sake. 3 Conceding that a comprehensive maritime code has never
been enacted by Congress, the Court maintained that when Congress has legislated in a specific area, the Court cannot supplement
the legislation in such a manner that it is meaningless. 34 Although
the Moragne action was intended to supplement federal statutory
remedies, the Court found that Moragne was dependent on the
conclusion that Congress limited DOHSA to the high seas in order
to preserve supplemental remedies in territorial waters. 3 The
Court stated that Congress did not intend to encourage nonpecuniary supplements by limiting DOHSA recovery to pecuniary loss. 6
Accordingly, the Court refused to substitute its views for those
expressed by Congress in DOHSA.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Blackmun, reiterated that neither Moragne nor Gaudet placed
emphasis on the waters in which death occurred. 37 The dissent
noted that the majority's narrow view of Gaudetmade recovery for
28.
29.
30.

436 U.S. at 622-23.
Id. at 623.
Id.

31. Id. at 624.
32. "The only disparity that concerns us today is the differences between
applying one national rule to fatalities in territorial waters and a slightly narrower
national rule to accidents farther from land." Id. at 624 n.18.
33. Id. at 624.
34. Id. at 625.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 626 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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loss of society depend on how far the decedent was from shore.3
Marshall viewed this anomaly as similar to those which Moragne
was designed to eliminate." Quoting from Moragne, Marshall criticized the majority's rule for "produc[ing] different results for
breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in
policy."'" Marshall further criticized the majority's interpretation
of the congressional intent behind DOHSA. Marshall reasoned
that, since DOSHA was intended to remedy problems created by
The Harrisburg, its remedial nature could not be construed as
limiting recovery only to pencuniary loss. Instead, Marshall suggested that Congress meant to ensure DOSHA plaintiffs a minimum recovery of pecuniary losses. According to Marshall, the majority's interpretation of the legislative history was inconsistent
with Moragne's conclusion that DOHSA was not intended to foreclose any nonstatutory federal remedies." By reading DOHSA as
a response to pre-Moragne rather than post-Moragne law, Marshall concluded that Congress had no intent to preclude recovery
beyond pecuniary loss. 3 Consequently, Marshall would have allowed recovery for loss of society in the instant case.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant case marks a retreat by the Supreme Court from the
recent trend of judicial reformation of maritime law begun by
Moragne." Under the instant case, the liberality of recovery embodied in Moragne ceases to exist beyond three miles from shore.
As noted by the dissent, the majority's basis for holding that Congress intended DOSHA to preclude recovery beyond pecuniary loss
is questionable. Since DOHSA was enacted at a time when no
federal action for wrongful death existed under general maritime
38. Id.
39. Id. at 627. Marshall specifically compared the majority's result to the
second anomaly articulated in the Moragne opinion, contained at note 13, supra.
40. Id. at 627 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
405 (1970).
41.

Id. at 628.

42. Id. at 629.
43. Id. at 630.
44. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 374.
45. "[I]t better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in
admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it
by established and inflexible rules." 398 U.S. at 387 (quoting The Sea Gull, 21

F. Cas. 909 (C.C. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578).
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law, it is doubtful that Congress was intending to preclude that
which the Supreme Court had held to be nonexistent. In its historical context, DOHSA should be construed as a remedial statute
providing a minimum recovery. Since the courts have been willing
to supplement DOHSA with a general maritime survival action,46
there is no compelling reason why the general maritime wrongful
death action should not also supplement DOHSA. Under the majority's narrow reading of Moragne and Gaudet, congressional action will be necessary before the families of decedents who died on
the high seas can recover for their loss of society. It is not clear
whether the impact of the instant opinion can be circumvented by
applying Moragne and Gaudet in a suit under the Savings to Suitors Clause. In Moragne, Justice Harlan suggested that, although
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over DOHSA suits, if suit
were brought in nonadmiralty court under the Savings to Suitors
Clause, Moragne could be applied to the high seas.47 However,
since the instant Court rejected Moragne as a supplement to
DOHSA in an admiralty court, it is likely that nonadmiralty
courts would be forced to follow the instant Court's interpretation
of DOHSA. Concerning deaths within territorial waters, the majority seems to affirm that plaintiffs in those cases can recover loss
of society. This affirmation is significant since the instant majority
is comprised primarily of the Gaudet dissenters." Rather than
adhering to their dissenting views in Gaudet,49 the instant majority
affirms Gaudet only.as it applies to territorial waters.
Michael P. Coury
46. See discussion of Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974), at note
21, supra.
47. 398 U.S. at 400; see G. GLMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 368.
48. The instant majority was comprised of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stevens, Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist. The Gaudet dissent was com-

prised of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart and Rehnquist.
49. See Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1973).

ANTITRUST-E.E.C. TREATY-JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT THAT
OPERATES TO PRECLUDE ENTRY INTO A GEOGRAPHIC MARKET IS PROHIBITED UNDER ARTICLE 85 OF THE E.E.C. TREATY
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The Commission of the European Communities (Commission),
in a proceeding under article 85 of the European Economic Community Treaty (E.E.C. Treaty)' considered the anticompetitive
effects of a proposed joint venture agreement 2 between WasagChemie Gmbh (WASAG), a West German manufacturer, 3 and
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI), a United Kingdom manufacturer.' WASAG is the largest producer of blackpowder 5 in the
Common Market. ICI is the major user and the only supplier of
blackpowder in the United Kingdom.' Under the agreement ICI
and WASAG would obtain joint and equal financial control of
WANO Schwarzpulver & Co. Kunigunde KG (WANO), a blackpowder manufacturing plant presently wholly owned by WASAG.7
The agreement committed ICI and WASAG to purchase blackpowder exclusively from WANO. 8 The agreement also provided that an
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Treaty].
2. Regulation 17, article 4, 5 O.J. COMM. EuR. 204 (1962), requires that agreements falling within the description of article 85(1) of the E.E.C. Treaty, and in
respect of which parties seek the application of article 85(3), be brought to the
Commission's attention. See notes 18 & 19 infra. Upon notification, the Commission must hear the parties pursuant to Regulation 17, article 19, before determining whether the agreement can proceed.
3. Bohlen Industry AG, of which WASAG is a controlled subsidiary also
signed the agreement.
4. The affected portion of the ICI enterprise was Nobel Explosive Co. Ltd., a
controlled subsidiary of ICI.
5. Blackpowder is one of the oldest known explosives. It was used for blasting,
for military purposes, and as a component in the manufacturing of fireworks,
pyrotechnical devices, and safety fuses. The transport and st6rage of the product
is subject to government regulation and licensing.
6. WASAG and ICI both produce a variety of products including chemicals
and mechanical devices used in conjunction with explosives.
7. Pursuant to the agreement, ICI would purchase shares of stock and contribute additional capital in order to achieve joint and equal control of WANO. The
agreement prohibited either party from taking unilateral action on any issue
relating to blackpowder.
8. Under a 1974 letter of intent between the parties, ICI's subsidiary, Noble
Explosive Co., would continue operating in its blackpowder plant until its customers' and its own needs could be transferred to the joint venture. After the
transfer, the agreement required Nobel Explosive and WASAG to fulfill their
775
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ICI subsidiary9 would be the exclusive distributor for WANO's
product in Great Britain and that WASAG would be the exclusive
distributor in West Germany. WASAG and ICI contended that the
agreements would not restrict competition in violation of Common
Market regulations prohibiting agreements with anticompetitive
effects' because even without the joint venture the British market
for blackpowder would not be competitive. The parties argued that
WANO is the only supplier capable of satisfying the United Kingdom's blackpowder requirements." The Commission found that
manufacturers in other Common Market countries who were willing and able to sell'" in the British market would be precluded from
competing by the joint venture agreement.' 3 In addition, the Commission found that the proposed agreement would have an appreciable effect on competition because of the size and position of the
companies involved." Rejecting the parties' arguments that the
benefits of the agreement'" qualified it for exemption from the
total blackpowder requirements from the joint venture. Both parties agreed to
assign all their assets related to the manufacture of blackpowder, including knowhow, patents and goodwill, to the joint venture.
9. Nobel Explosive Co., Ltd.
10. Article 85(1) of the E.E.C. Treaty prohibits agreements between parties
that would restrict competition in the Common Market. For text of article 85(1)
see note 18 infra.
11. The parties argued that: (1) WANO was the only plant capable of supplying the quality of blackpowder necessary to meet British demands; (2) the United
Kingdom Ministry of Defense required WANO to fulfull British requirements
because only they could meet the military's specifications; and (3) the national
regulations concerning the transport and storage of blackpowder made it difficult
and impractical for other producers to comply with them.
12. Manufacturers in France and Italy reported to the Commission that they
were willing and able to supply blackpowder to the United Kingdom. These firms
had the capacity to meet new customer's demands. ICI conceded that the grade
of blackpowder produced by these firms would be suitable for certain of their
needs.
13. The Commission reasoned that since ICI was the only supplier of blackpowder in the United Kingdom, its agreement to purchase its total blackpowder
demand from WANO would exclude all other blackpowder producers from the
British market.
14. In the Commission's announcement of May 27, 1970, Concerning Minor
Agreements, O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. C 64) 1 (1970), the Commission stated that
only agreements having an appreciable effect on market conditions would be
subject to the article 85(1) prohibition.
15. The parties argued that their pooled technology and resources would enable them to develop new manufacturing processes. They also contended that the
agreement would ensure the Community greater security in its supply of blackpowder.
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article 85(1) prohibition, the Commission concluded that the
agreement could not be granted an exemption under article 85(3)16
because ICI's participation in the agreement would effectively preclude competition in the British market for blackpowder. In an
original Commission proceeding, held: A joint venture that operates to preclude all competitors from entry into a geographic market violates article 85(1) of the E.E.C. Treaty and cannot be exempted under article 85(3). Re WANO Schwarzpulver Gmbh, 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 403 (1979).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Commission of the European Economic Community is empowered to investigate agreements between enterprises and to
issue and enforce orders terminating those agreements in violation
of the anticompetitive regulations of the E.E.C. Treaty.'7 Article
85(1) of the Treaty prohibits activities between enterprises that
have prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within
the Common Market as their goal or effect."8 Agreements prohib16. For text of article 85(3) see note 19 infra.
17. In 1962 the Council of Ministers adopted Regulation 17, 5 J.O. EuR. COMM.
204 (1962), which established the scheme of enforcement for Common Market
rules protecting competition. Pursuant to that regulation, the Commission obtained authority to investigate activities between enterprises and review enterprises in violation of article 85 and 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty. The Counsel also
authorized the Commission to issue cease and desist orders and impose daily
penalties and fines to compel adherence to its decisions.
18. The text of article 85(1) states:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited: all agreements between enterprises, any
decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which
are likely to affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market and in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any
other trade conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in
respect of equivalent supplies, placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance
by a party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
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ited under article 85(1), which meet certain conditions, may qualify for an exemption under article 85(3) of the Treaty.'9 This exemption allows the enterprises to proceed with their proposed activity even though the plan technically violates regulations concerning activities with an anticompetitive effect on the Community."0 In its 1966 Memorandum on Concentration,' the Commission clarified that article 85 applies to joint ventures. Recognizing that it would not apply to an actual merger in which the parties
involved became one enterprise, the Commission distinguished a
joint venture arrangement in which the participating parties retained their economic independence.22 Although the Commission
announced a policy to determine the anticompetitive effects of
joint venture agreements on a case by case basis,2 there has been
a definite pattern to its decisions. In a number of situations the

of such contract.
E.E.C. Treaty, art. 85, para. 1, supra note 1 at 47.
19. The text of article 85(3) states as follows:
Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 (of Article 85) may be declared
inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between enterprises,
-any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises and,
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute
to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the
promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an
equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not
indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect
of a substantial proportion of the goods concerned.
E.E.C. Treaty, art. 85, para. 3, supra note 1 at 48.
20. The actual effect of an article 85(3) exemption is to admit a violation of
article 85(1) but to render 85(1) inapplicable to the agreement in question.
21. Commission of the European Communities, Memorandum to the Governments of the Member States on Concentration of Enterprises in the Common
Market, reprinted in Comm. MKT. REP. No. 26 (CCH) 58 at 27 (1966) (out of
print). The memorandum resulted from the work of a committee of independent
experts formed to deal with the problem of concentrations between enterprises.
Id.
22. The Commission reasoned that an actual merger is a complete concentration not subject to article 85. The situation in which parties retain their independence does not fall within the term "complete concentration," thus, such agreements are subject to article 85. Id. For discussion of the Commission's reasoning
on the issue see Spinks, The ContemporaryAntitrust Regulation of Joint Ventures in the European Community, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 373, 383-84 (1978).
23. COMMISSION
POLIcY 38 (1977).

OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITIEs, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
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Commission applied article 85(1) to joint venture arrangements
without discussing the unique organizational characteristics of a
joint venture. 24 The Commission first discussed the application of
article 85 to a joint venture in SHV/Chevron,2 concluding that the
article did not prohibit a joint venture arrangement in which the
parent companies abandoned their business in the produce area
covered by the joint venture.2 The Commission reasoned that because the parent companies withdrew from the field, they would
no longer compete with each other or with the joint venture in the
sale of the product manufactured by the joint venture. Thus, the
Commission treated such an agreement as a partial merger to
which article 85(1) did not apply. It determined that the agreement would not threaten competition in related product markets
in which both parties dealt since those markets were distinct from
the joint venture area.Y In Bayer/Gist,21 the Commission determined that an agreement between two competing firms to create
joint subsidiaries that would supply them with raw materials
would also restrict competition between the parent companies in
29
related product markets.
The Commission reasoned that combined efforts at the raw material level would induce coordinated conduct in the field of intermediate products and cooperation between the parties relating to
24.

See, e.g., Henkle/Colgate, 15 J.O. Comm. EUR. (No. L 14) (1972). See

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION

POLICY 25-26 (1974).
25. In re Application of Steenkolen-Handelsvereeniging NV & Chevon Oil
Europe, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 38) 15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
SHV/Chevron]. See Linssen, Joint Subsidiaries; The S.H. V./Chevron Case, 13
COMMON. MKT. L. REV. 105 (1976) for a detailed criticism of the case.
26. The parties, who had previously maintained independent distribution networks for petroleum products, proposed jointly and equally owned subsidiaries to
distribute those products in the Common Market. Pursuant to the agreement,
both parties would vest all assets of their previous distribution network in the
joint companies and agree not to compete with those companies. SHV/Chevron,
18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 38) 14 (1975).
27. Id. The propensity of joint control of a subsidiary to lead to restricted
competition was labeled the "group effect" in the Sidmar case, EUROPEAN COAL
AND STEEL COMMUNITY, THE HIGH AUTHORITY, I1TH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTiviTIES OF THE COMMUNITY 320-25 (1963), a decision under the E.C.S.C. Treaty. In
Sidmar and other decisions under that treaty, the High Authority found that
absent an express agreement not to compete in other areas, the group effect was
not an independent restriction subject to the prohibitions of the treaty, but was
a natural consequence of joint control.
28. Bayer/Gist-Brocades, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 13 (1976).
29. Id.
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the marketing of the processed goods.3" Because the agreement
would benefit the Common Market, the Commission granted the
parties an exemption conditioned on certain amendments to the
agreement. 1 In Bayer/Gist, however, the Commission clearly
enunciated its objection to joint venture agreements between firms
who remained competitors in related markets. Rendering an important determination in the KEWA decision, 2 the Commission
held that a joint venture agreement would violate article 85(1) if
the parent companies possessed the economic and technical ability
to compete in the area of the joint venture, even if they were not
presently competitors in that field.33 The Commission adhered to
3 ' in which two large, heavy
this policy in Vacuum Interrupters,
electrical firms formed a joint venture to develop a new product.
The Commission defined the parties as potential competitors because each had the capacity to independently develop and manufacture the product.36 The agreement would repress potential competition between them since its terms prohibited independent action by either party in the new product area.37 The Commission
30. Both parties manufactured and sold the raw product as well as intermediate and processed goods containing the product. Id.
31. The parties substituted specialization agreements and long-term mutual
supply contracts for the joint subsidiary arrangement. Although the Commission
indicated it would not exempt the joint subsidiary arrangement as originally
purposed, it did not render a firm decision on the issue. Id. at 15-16.
32. KEWA, 19 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 51) 15 (1976).
33. Four German firms proposed a joint subsidiary for the commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuels and the marketing of the resultant products. The firms
agreed not to operate in the field except through the joint venture. Because all
four firms possessed sophisticated technology and experience in areas similar to
that of the joint venture, the Commission felt they were capable of manufacturing
the product independently. Id. at 16.
34. Vacuum Interrupters, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 48) 32 (1977).
35. The parents set up Vacuum Interrupters Inc. to develop, design, manufacture, and sell vacuum interrupters (a new type of circuit breaker). Under the
agreement, the parents agreed not to compete with the joint venture. Additionally, the joint venture was to be the source of all their requirements of the product.
Although neither company was manufacturing the product independently, the
Commission felt that because of their experience, ability, and prior research in
the field each could have entered the market alone and thus were potential competitors. Id. at 36.
36.

Id.

37. Both parties to the joint venture agreed to refrain from independently
developing, manufacturing, or selling the product of the joint venture. The terms
of the agreement required the parties to make all decisions regarding the new
company jointly. Id.
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reasoned that the proposed plan could impede competition in the
United Kingdom, since future Community competitors in that
market would face one economically and technically powerful competitor rather than two relatively weaker ones."8 Finding that the
possible benefits to the Common Market outweighed the potential
reduction in competition, the Commission granted an article 85(3)
4 o and GEC/Weir"
exemption.3 9 In DeLaval/Stork
the Commission
again found joint venture agreements between competitors in related field violative of article 85(1). In both cases, the Commission
objected to the impediment of competition between the parent
companies concerning the product manufactured by the joint venture. Additionally, the Commission noted the likelihood of cooperation between the parties in other areas of mutual interest.4" As in
Bayer/Gist, however, the Commission exempted the agreements
because of their potential benefit to the Common Market.43 Applying a similar rationale in ICI/Montedison," the Commission held
38. The Commission felt that the combined strength of two major British
producers would be an insurmountable obstacle to smaller and weaker market
entrants. Id. at 36.
39. The agreement had been operating since 1968 and the Commission determined that the resultant benefits of reduced prices and stimulated research in the
area justified an exemption. The Commission, nevertheless, imposed certain conditions on the exemption to ensure that the joint venture would not lead to
collateral restrictions in areas other than the joint venture. Id. at 37-38.
40. DeLaval/Stork, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 215) 11 (1977).
41. GECIWeir Sodium Circulators, 20 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 327) 26 (1977).
42. The DeLaval/Stork agreement provided for a joint venture through which
the parent companies would merge their marketing activities in the turbine and
compressor industries. The companies remained competitors in some fields relating to the joint venture product. DeLaval/Stork, 20 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 215)
at 12-14. In GEC/Weir, two companies of considerable industrial significance
entered a joint venture agreement to develop, manufacture, and sell sodium circulators for use in nuclear fast reactors. Prior to the agreement the parties were
competitors in the sodium circulator field and at the expiration of the agreement
would again become competitors. During the operation of the agreement, the
companies would independently retain horizontally competitive vertically overlapping activities in related markets of the field. 20 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 327)
at 27-29.
43. The Commission found that the appreciable economic advantages offered
by the DeLaval/Stork agreement justified an exemption. DeLaval/Stork, 20 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. L 215) at 20. In GECIWeir, the Commission determined that
because of the high risks involved in the work of the subsidiary, the complementary expertise of the parties, and the urgent need to achieve safe performance in
the field, an exemption was justified. GEC/Weir, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L. 327)
at 33-35.
44. ICI/Montedison, COMMISSION OF THE EuRoPEAN ComuNITIES, SEVENTH
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that a joint venture agreement between two large companies would
restrict competition between the parents relating to the product
manufactured by the joint venture. Moreover, it would create'anticompetitive effects in the related fields in which the parties were
potential competitors.45 Although the Commission indicated that
a conditional exemption could be granted, the enterprises withdrew their plans.46 In Sopelem/Vickers,47 the Commission found a
joint venture agreement violative of article 85(1) in its effect on
competition between the parties. The agreement would eliminate
competition in research and development between the parents and
thus, impede their ability to remain independent developers. It
would also deprive them of autonomous marketing since one parent would serve as the sole distributor of the product in the United
Kingdom and Ireland and the joint venture would be the exclusive
distributor in the rest of the Community." Noting strong competition in the field of the joint venture, and the minor share of the
market that the parties held, 9 the Commission determined that
the restrictive effects of the agreement were counterbalanced by
the advantages and granted an exemption. 0 Thus, in developing
its policy towards joint venture agreements, the Commission has
continually broadened the reach of article 85(1) to prohibit joint
venture agreements which restrict competition among the Member

REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 117 (1977).

45. The parties agreed to establish a joint subsidiary to produce chemical
substances that they both required in the manufacture of their intermediate
products. The Commission reasoned that the agreement would restrict competition between the parties since they were both competitors in similar markets and
potential competitors in the market for the product of the joint venture. Id.
46. The Commission found that the long-term effect of the agreement would
increase competition in the Common Market, improve production and technology, and benefit consumers. The parties, however, abandoned the joint venture
before the Commission developed specific conditions and obligations for an exemption. Id.
47. SopelemNickers, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 707) 47 (1977).
48. The parties both manufactured a wide range of microscopes. They agreed
to create a joint venture to coordinate research and development. Pursuant to the
agreement they were to combine marketing efforts so that all distribution of their
products would be handled jointly. Id. at 47-48.
49. The combined overall share of the market held by these parties was 3.5
percent. Id. at 49.
50. The Commission determined that the agreement would hasten development and technological progress in the microscope field, improve distribution of
microscopes in the Community, and result in lower costs to consumers. Id. at 50-
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States. Prior to the instant decision, however, the Commission has
never refused to grant an exemption to a joint venture agreement
that it found violative of article 85(1).
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant proceeding the Commission determined that
WASAG/ICI joint venture agreement would have the following
anticompetitive results: (1) the parent companies would be precluded from making independent decisions in the joint venture
field; (2) the joint venture would control fifty-eight percent of
blackpowder sales in the Common Market; (3) ICI, a major purchaser of blackpowder, would fulfill its entire requirements for the
product from a single supplier; (4) the parent companies, natural
competitors in the field, would cease competing in the joint venture area; (5) heightened cooperation between the companies
would discourage competition between them in other fields in
which they both dealt; and (6) the British market would be closed
to suppliers from other Community States and British customers
therefore would be deprived of an opportunity to purchase from
other Community suppliers." The Commission determined that
because the parties are wealthy and dominant in the Community
and the blackpowder market is oligopolistic, the restrictive effects
of their agreement would be appreciable.5 2 Because the agreement
would virtually obviate all competition in the British market, the
Commission reasoned that it would not meet the condition stated
in article 85(3) that exemption is appropriate only if an agreement
does not "eliminate competition in respect to a substantial part of
the product. ' '53 The Commission noted that regardless of this fac-

tor, the agreement would not otherwise qualify for exemption because the parties did not prove that the joint venture would offer
substantial benefits to the Community. 4 Thus, the Commission
found the agreement to appreciably restrain Common Market
competition and not warrant exemption because of its elimination
of competition in a substantial market. Therefore, the Commission
prohibited the parties from implementing their plan.
51.

1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411-16.

52.

Id. at 416.

53. Id. at 417. For full text of article 85(3), see note 19 supra.
54. Id. at 417. For a description of the asserted benefits, see note 15 supra.
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COMMENT

In its first absolute denial of clearance to a joint venture agreement, the Commission took a major step toward clarifying its policy regarding these matters. The finding of an article 85(1) violation is consistent with the Commission's decisions since
SHV/Chevron. What is distinctive in the instant decision is the
Commission's failure to exempt the agreement under article 85(3).
The fact that the Commission adopted the decision despite the
parties' abandonment of the agreement indicates that it deemed
a statement in this area necessary. The agreement's form is similar
to that of other joint venture agreements which were previously
granted exemptions. Many of those agreements involved competitors holding market positions equally powerful as the position of
the parties in the instant case. 5 In past decisions the Commission
exempted agreements from article 85(1) in which the joint venture
would act as the exclusive supplier of products required by both
parents. 6 The ICI/WASAG proposal, however, differs from the
agreements in prior cases in its effect. The previous joint venture
agreements would have reduced competition in the community,
but in all cases the market would have remained open to other
competitors. Conversely, the instant agreement would have eliminated all competition in the British blackpowder market. In determining this effect to fall within the 85(3) language prohibiting
exemptions when the proposed activities would eliminate competition in respect to a substantial proportion of the product, the Commission offered its first interpretation of that language in the article, setting a standard for future cases. Accordingly, the Commission has announced that an agreement which operates to foreclose
competition in a large market will not be tolerated. It remains to
be seen how this interpretation will be applied in future cases. It
should be noted that the WANO agreement is unique in two ways.
First, it would obviate all competition in a significant geographic
market. Second, the product involved is not of particular importance to modern, technology and does not involve expensive advanced technological processes which necessitate cooperation between competitors for technological reasons. The Commission nay
be more lenient towards agreements which substantially restrict,
but do not eliminate competition in a geographic market, and
55.
56.

See, e.g., DeLaval/Stork, 20 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L. 215) 11 (1977).
See, e.g., ICI/Montedison, COMMISSION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNITIES,

SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

117 (1977).
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which involve products important to modem technology. In the
instant case the Commission found consideration of the benefits of
the ICI/WASAG proposal to be unnecessary. This indicates that
an agreement which completely insulates a market from competition will not be allowed to proceed regardless of the advantages it
would offer the Common Market.
Celia J. Collins

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TEAs STATUTE'S DENIAL OF FREE
EDUCATION TO ILLEGAL ALIENS VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
AND IS PREEMPTED BY THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs, I a group of Mexican illegal alien children residing in
Tyler, Texas, sought injunctive and declaratory relief2 to prevent
their exclusion from the public schools in the Tyler Independent
School District [TISD]. Defendants, officials of the TISD, 3 alleged that section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code' [section
21.031] authorized TISD to adopt a policy 5 permitting only United

States citizens and legally documented aliens6 residing in TISD to
attend public schools free of tuition.7 Plaintiffs alleged that section
21.031, as implemented by the TISD policy, denied them equal
protection of the laws' and was preempted by the federal Immigra1. The action was maintained as a class action on behalf of all undocumented
school-aged children of Mexican origin residing within the boundaries of the Tyler
Independent School District.
2. A complaint and motion for preliminary injunction were filed on September 6, 1977. On September 9, 1977, the court granted the preliminary injunction.
The final hearing was held on December 12 and 13. The attorney general of Texas
participated as a defendant. The United States Department of Justice was
granted leave to participate as an amicus curiae.
3. The Superintendent and members of the Board of Trustees of the Tyler
Independent School District.
4. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1976) provides in part:
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state
shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all
persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning
of the scholastic year if such a person or his parent, guardian or person
having lawful control resides within the school district.
5. The TISD policy provides in part:
The Tyler Independent School District shall enroll all qualified students
who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens, and who
are residents of this school district, free of tuition charge. Illegal alien children may enroll and attend school in the Tyler Independent School District
by payment of the full tuition fee.
458 F. Supp. 569, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
6. A legally-documented alien is a legally admitted alien who has documentation that he or she is legally in the United States, or a person who is in the process
of securing documentation from the United States Immigration Service. Id.
7. The school board policy requires that undocumented alien children pay
$1,000 per year to attend public school.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tion and Nationality Act' [Immigration Act]. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted an injunction on both grounds. 0 Held: A state statute denying free public
school education to illegal aliens violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and is preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569
(E.D. Tex. 1978).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides that "no
state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, and property without
2
due process of the law [emphasis added]."" In Mathews v. Diaz,'
the Supreme Court noted in dictum that this due process protection extends to illegal aliens. Section one also provides that "no
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws [emphasis added]."' 3 In Bolanos v. Kiley,"
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that despite the difference in wording between the two fourteenth amendment protections, illegal aliens also are entitled to equal protection of the laws.
Courts traditionally perform a two-tiered analysis to determine if
a state statute violates the equal protection clause." If the statute
threatens a fundamental right or creates a suspect classification
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976) provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, if the Secretary of Labor has determined
and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A)
there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and for admission into the United
States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will adversely affect
the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed.
10. The instant court also granted declaratory relief.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
15. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
16. Fundamental rights are those rights explicitly expressed in the Constitution. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The Supreme Court has also found additional fundamental rights. See, e.g., Roe v.
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of individuals, '7 the court will strictly scrutinize the state interest
served by the statute and will sustain the statute only if the interest is compelling. 8 Absent these two characteristics, the state law
need only be supported by a rational basis. 9 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 0 the Supreme Court held
that education was not a fundamental right because it is not
among those afforded explicit protection by the Constitution.2' The
Court noted, however, that an absolute deprivation of education
would have presented "a far more compelling set of circumstances
for judicial assistance." 2 Although the courts have not specifically
held that illegal aliens are a suspect class, the Supreme Court in
Graham v. Richardson3 indicated that legally admitted aliens
may be a suspect class. In DeCanas v. Bica,2 4 the Court held a
California statute2 ' constitutional which prohibited employers
from knowingly hiring illegal aliens instead of lawful resident
workers. The DeCanas Court did not rule on whether illegal aliens
are a suspect- class because neither party had standing to raise an
equal protection argument.26 Because of the California statute's
direct effect upon immigration, the DeCanas Court had to determine whether the statute was preempted by federal law.27 The
Court employed a three-part test which required that the statute
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 336
(1971) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel).
17. A suspect class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
18. 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
19. 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 25 n.60.
23. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
24. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West 1971). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers.
26. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976). The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of limiting employment in order to limit immigration. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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must not: (1) impermissibly interfere with the federal government's exclusive power to regulate immigration;18 (2) operate in a
field where federal regulation prohibits the exercise or existence of
any state regulatory power;"9 and (3) obstruct the accomplishment
and execution of congressional purposes and objectives embodied
in the Immigration Act. 0 The Court found the California statute
valid according to all three criteria and stated that the statute was
consistent with the federal policy to regulate immigration by limiting employment opportunities .3 No state statute which attempts
to regulate immigration by limiting educational opportunities to
children has yet been challenged as either a violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause or as preempted by
federal law.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, the district court held that section 21.031
violated the plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws and
served no rational state interest." Despite the differing language
of each constitutional privilege conferred by section one of the
fourteenth amendment, the court found that illegal aliens should
receive both due process and equal protection privileges.33 It noted
that the Texas statute, as implemented by the TISD policy, created a distinct class of poor illegal alien children who were deprived of all education.3 4 The court limited the Rodriguez conclusion, that education is not a fundamental right, to the kind of
relative deprivation of education challenged in that particular
case. 31 It noted that Rodriguez conspicuously did not foreclose the
use of strict judicial scrutiny in cases where there is an absolute
28. 424 U.S. 351, 354, 356 (1976).
29. Id. at 356.
30. The federal purpose and objective is the exclusion of illegal aliens. This
differs from the federal policy, embodied in the Immigration Act, to accomplish
this purpose by limiting United States employment opportunities of illegal aliens.
31. 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976).
32. 458 F. Supp. 569, 585, 589 (1978).

33. Id. at 579.
34. The court briefly mentioned that the statute and TISD policy also dis-

criminated on the basis of wealth since the illegal alien children could attend
public school after payment of a tuition fee of $1,000 per year. The court concluded that this discrimination should heighten strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 581.
35. In Rodriquez, the state statute allegedly deprived the plaintiff of an education equal to that received by students in property rich communities. However,
the statute did not prevent children from attending school altogether. Id. at 580.
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deprivation of educational opportunities." Section 21.031 could
also be subject to strict scrutiny, according to the court, because
illegal aliens might be considered a suspect class.3 Although no
previous court had designated illegal aliens as a suspect class, the
instant court noted that such a classification would be appropriate
if a state acted independently of the policy of the Immigration
Act18 to achieve the federal exclusionary purpose by condoning the
immigration of illegal aliens and then subjecting them to discriminatory laws.39
The court concluded that the Texas statute was inconsistent
with the Immigration Act's policy because section 21.031 restricted
educational opportunities of illegal alien children rather than limiting employment opportunities of their parents. 0 It noted that
DeCanas had been consistent with this policy since the California
statute limited the employment opportunities of adult illegal aliens by penalizing their employers.4 ' The instant court concluded
that section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code, as implemented
by the TISD policy, was an ineffectual attempt by the state legislature to exclude illegal aliens and that no rational basis42 exists to
sustain it against an equal protection challenge.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant court subtly disguised the rationale of its holding
with an extensive discussion of new constitutional protections for
illegal aliens. The Texas statute may in fact have a rational basis
and may not be invalidated by a proper application of the DeCanas
preemption test. The court's application of fourteenth amendment
equal protection to illegal aliens reflects a recent tendency of lower
courts to extend rights to this group. 3 The instant decision builds
36. Id. at 580-81.
37. Id. at 583.
38. According to the instant court, the Immigration Act instructed that the
federal purpose to eliminate illegal immigration be carried out by reducing employment opportunities in the United States for illegal aliens. Id. at 583, 591.
39. Id. at 583.
40. Id. at 588.
41. Id. at 587-88.
42. The court struck down defendant's argument that the statute is supported
by a rational state interest, namely, preserving state revenues to educate U.S.
citizens and legally admitted aliens who reside in Texas because illegal alien
children would require special educational aid. Id. at 589.
43. See Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954
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upon the Supreme dourt's ruling in Mathews," which extended
fourteenth amendment due process protection to illegal aliens. By
invalidating the Texas statute, the court also reached two unprecedented findings. First, despite the Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental right, the instant court indicated that a
state statute which deprives a child of all education requires strict
judicial scrutiny justification by a compelling state interest. 5 Second, the court noted that because illegal aliens may be considered
a suspect class, the state statute could therefore be strictly scrutinized." This progresses beyond the Court's decision in Graham,47
which asserted that aliens who are legally admitted may be a suspect class. This extensive constitutional analysis established the
court's prerogative to strictly scrutinize and then strike down the
statute for lack of a compelling state interest. Instead, the instant
court invalidated the statute for lack of a rational basis. Such a
rational basis may, in fact, exist. The statute, for example, may
enable Texas to conserve revenues otherwise required both to
educate an excessive number of students and to satisfy the special
educational needs of alien children. 8 Furthermore, the statute
may discourage illegal immigration by not guaranteeing free public school education to the children of undocumented aliens. Also,
in determining the issue of preemption, the court, mistakenly, did
not explicitly apply all three parts of the DeCanas test and erroneously based its holding on the statute's failure to meet the third
part of the test. The court could have found that section 21.031 met
the first two parts of this test because the statute's aim was to
protect the educational opportunities of the state's legal residents
and not to directly attempt to regulate immigration.49 The court
correctly recognized that section 21.031, unlike the DeCanas stat(1976); Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Barbera,
514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).

44. 426 U.S. at 77 (1976).
45. This approach differs from Justice Marshall's sliding scale of rights approach employed in Rodriquez. In that case, Marshall determined that certain

rights should be given stricter judicial scrutiny than other rights. In the instant
case, the court accords fundamental right status and strict judicial scrutiny to
an absolute deprivation of education while recognizing that a relative deprivation

of education would not receive such scrutiny.
46. 458 F. Supp. at 583.
47.
48.

403 U.S. at 365 (1971).
458 F. Supp. at 575-76.

49. Id. at 585.
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ute, did not embody the specific exclusionary policy of limiting
United States employment opportunities for illegal aliens." Nevertheless, the statute may satisfy the third part of the test, and its
absence may even impair the federal government's general purpose
to exclude illegal aliens from the states. Thus, the statute may not
only have a rational basis, but also may satisfy all three parts of
the DeCanas preemption test. A successful challenge to invalidate
the Texas statute, therefore, may necessarily depend upon the
unprecedented constitutional findings embodied in the instant
opinion. Although the court may have been overly concerned with
furnishing free education to all children, whether United States
citizens or illegal aliens, the instant decision provides strong justification for strict judicial scrutiny of similar state statutes.2
Spencer M. Sax
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976). See note 27 supra.
51. 458 F. Supp. at 584.
52. After the instant decision the Texas Court of Appeals in Hernandez v.

Houston Independent School District, 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977 writ ref'd n.r.e.), dismissed a challenge concerning the constitutionality of
section 21.031. The defendants in the instant case did not argue that the
Hernandez decision was binding on the instant court. 458 F. Supp. at 574.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-FOREIGN
OF 1976-"DIRECT
CONTACTS

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES

ACT

EFFECTS" UNDER § 1605(A)2 REQUIRES MINIMUM

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs, New England Petroleum Corp. (Nepco), a New York
corporation, and its assignee,' seek damages for an alleged breach
of contract to supply petroleum products. Plaintiff's subsidiaries,
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. (Petco) and Antco Shipping Co.
(Antco)2 entered into a series of contracts with the Libyan National
Oil Corporation (N.O.C.) in 1973 following nationalization of the
Libyan oil fields.3 Libya imposed an embargo on oil to the United
States and the Bahamas as a result of the Yom Kippur war of
October, 1973. At the invitation of N.O.C., Petco submitted bids
for new contracts which were finalized in 1974.1 Petco accepted
delivery under the new contracts through 1975 and then failed to
make payment. N.O.C. sought a winding up of Petco's affairs by
petition in the Bahamas. In April 1977, Nepco filed suit in the New
York Supreme Court, which was subsequently removed to United
States District Court.5 The claims against N.O.C., totalling $1.6
billion, alleged breach of the 1973 contracts,6 duress in negotiating
th. 1974 contracts, and frustration of the contracts in which Nepco
was allegedly a known beneficiary. Nepco also charged Libya with
deliberately inducing the breaches by N.O.C. 7 In the United States
1.

Nepco's alleged'assignee is Edward G. Carey.

2.

Both Petco and Antco are Bahamian corporations.

3.

Petco was seeking oil for Nepco's United States consumers. The original

contracts were between Petco and a United States oil concession which held fields
in Libya. On September 1, 1973, Libya nationalized 51% of its oil concessions and
the United States concern immediately abrogated its contract with Petco. N.O.C.
has been formed in 1970 as a wholly government-owned entity empowered to
control the Libyan oil industry. The two contracts Petco entered into with N.O.C.
called for per barrel prices of approximately $5, both higher than the prices
obtained from the United States oil concession. By February, 1974, Libya had
nationalized its entire oil industry and had transferred control to N.O.C.
4. The final contract specified a price of $16.00 per barrel for the first quarter
of 1974, with provisions for later adjustments.
5. Removal was accomplished pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, § 6, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
6. Nepco charged that performance of the 1974 contract had been conditioned
upon performance of the 1973 contracts, which N.O.C. had failed to perform
properly.
7. Nepco specifically alleged the following claims: (1) and (2) breach by Libya
and N.O.C. of the 1973 contracts; (3) duress in negotiating the 1974 contracts;
795
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District Court for the Southern District of New York, dismissed.
Held: A foreign state is not amenable to suit in the United States
when its activities have no "direct effects" within United States
boundaries and these "direct effects" must be interpreted in light
of minimum contacts. Carey v. National Oil Corporation,453 F.
Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was intended to
remedy problems in United States immunity law in addition to
codifying its essential tenets. The Act reaffirms the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity9 and vests exclusive power in the judicial branch to decide whether such immunity should be granted."0
The Act is essentially divided into two components. The first, 28
U.S.C. § 1330, creates a federal long-arm statute allowing in
personam jurisdiction over foreign states when the necessary con(4) frustration of the contracts by Libya and N.O.C. although Nepco was allegedly a known beneficiary; (6) and (7) deliberate inducement by Libya of N.O.C.'s
breach of contract; (8) deliberate inducement by Libya and N.O.C. of the entire
series of circumstances leading to the breach.'
Claim (5) dealt with breach by Antco of two charter contracts with the Libyan
Maritime Transport Co. This claim was based and decided upon the same issues
as the oil contracts.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1976). The legislative history consists of the
identical text of the Senate and House reports that were issued at the time of the
Act's passage. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 (hereinafter cited as H.R. 1487).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976); see also H.R. 1487, supra n.8, at 7. The restrictive
theory of immunity was adopted as policy by the State Department in the "Tate
Letter" of 1952. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984. Sovereign immunity as originally
adopted in this country upheld the absolute independence of sovereigns as part
of the law of nations. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
116 (1812). The courts adhered to this absolute doctrine and gradually established
the principle that the courts would uphold a plea for immunity by the State
Department, based on the executive control of foreign policy. This principle culminated in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), and Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S.
578 (1943), in which the Supreme Court refused to question a grant of immunity
by the State Department. Changes in international commercial and legal principles led the government, through the Tate Letter, to adopt the restrictive principle of immunity, thereby granting immunity only for public acts of the sovereign,
not for private or commercial acts.
10. H.R. 1487, supra n.8, at 8, 9. The purpose was to remedy situations where
the foreign state could determine which immunity claims to take to the State
Department, and which to leave to the courts. It was also intended to alleviate
cases when the foreign state could exert diplomatic pressure on the State Department, making uniform application of the policy difficult. Id.
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tacts with the United States exist. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 1602
et seq., grants a blanket immunity to foreign states' 2 subject to
exceptions dealing with private or commercial activities. The longarm portion of the statute grants subject matter jurisdiction to the
courts based on acts of the foreign state falling within one of the
exceptions to immunity described in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. The
section then grants personal jurisdiction to the courts based on the
existence of minimum contacts between the foreign state and the
United States.' 3 The exceptions to immunity most importantly
deal with the private or commercial activities of foreign states. The
section which excepts immunity for commercial activities, 28
U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), allows, in the first two clauses, jurisdiction over
acts committed by a foreign state either wholly or partially within
the United States. Clause three gives jurisdiction over acts occuring entirely outside of the territorial United States when there is a
direct effect within this country.' 4 This third clause adds an impor11.

28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976) provides in relevant part:
(a)

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction .

.

. as to any

claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under
any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim
for releif over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection

(a) ....

12.

28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) provides in relevant part that "[s]ubject to

existing international agreements to which the United States is a party ...

a

foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter."
13. The legislative history describes the phrase "minimum contacts" as embodying the requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (jurisdiction found over a company where there was some presence in the state including
a continuous activity that sought to secure the benefits, protection and privileges
of the laws of that state) and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957) (jurisdiction found over a Texas company that had no personal presence
in California but had mailed policy to customer and collected premiums). H.R.
1487, supra note 8, at 13.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) provides that a foreign state shall not be
immune from jurisdiction in the courts of the United States in any casein which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
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tant additional consideration to obtaining jurisdiction. While the
first two clauses deal with acts inside of the United States and
therefore clearly lend themselves to analysis based on minimum
contacts, clause three requires that the activity of the foreign state
be interpreted in terms of its direct effect within this country.
"Direct effect," according to the legislative history, should be interpreted in a manner consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965) .15The degree of contact required under the RESTATEMENT is indicated in Comment f. to § 18

and involves "more than a mere causal relationship: the effect
within the territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside of the territory." 6 This
language, while clearly requiring an effect to be substantial and
direct, falls short of requiring minimum contacts with the forum.
The question thus becomes whether clause three is to be interpreted in terms of direct effect alone, or in conjunction with minimum contacts, and further, what effects are sufficently'direct to
allow jurisdiction. The statutory language by itself would seem to
indicate a direct effects test alone. There is evidence, however, that
Congress intended at least some contact with the United States.
During hearings for the Act it was emphasized "that the long-arm
feature of the bill will insure that only those disputes which have
a relation to the United States are litigated in the courts of the
United States, and that our courts are not turned into small
'international court of claims.' "17 The legislative history itself
notes that "[s]ignificantly, each of the immunity provisions in the
bill, sections 1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United States. . . ."I' In addition, the RESTATEMENT
15. H.R. 1487, supra note 8, at 19.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-

provides in relevant part that a state has jurisdiction if(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii)
it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18, Comment f.
(1965).
17. Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearingson
H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976)
(statement of Bruno A. Ristan).
18. H.R. 1487, supra note 8, at 13.
TIONS LAW § 18
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includes trademark infringement as an example of direct effect
and infers that the phrase requires some contact with the forum.'"
Thus, according to the Act, essentially two steps are required to
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state. First, the activity must
qualify as an exception to immunity. This would involve, in the
case of section 1605, first determining whether the act constitutes
a commercial activity, then next determining whether it either
occurred or created a direct effect within the United States. The
court must then establish personal jurisdiction through application of minimum contacts theory. While satisfying the criteria of
an act within the United States would also satisfy the requirements of minimum contacts, the answer is not clear in dealing with
the direct effect clause. An additional problem is that the courts
have been inconsistent in their analyses in the few cases to arise
since the Act went into force. At least one case since the Act was
passed failed to find a sufficient contact between a corporation
located in Bermuda, owned by a United States company, and a
Yugoslavian company." A recent district court decision, YesseninVolpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 2' avoided consideration of the direct effects issue but indicated that specific contacts will be required to obtain jurisdiction. In that case, plaintiff sued the Soviet
news agency Novosti and its press arm Tass in libel for letters
published outside of the United States but sent within United
States boundaries by means outside of the control of Novosti. The
court quickly disposed of the claims based on the first two clauses
of section 1605(a) (2) since there was no act, either whole or partial,
within the United States. The court, however, used a novel approach when it addressed the third clause claim. According to the
court in Yessenin-Volpin, an entity that conducts commercial activity may at times take action which is really governmental in
nature and thus subject to immunity.2 The court concluded that
the letters published by Novosti had to be regarded as "official
commentary of the Soviet government" and the plaintiff would not
be allowed to reach that commentary through the Novosti press
19.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw

§ 18, REporters' Note

4 at 56 (1965).
20. Edlow Int'l v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C.
1977). In Edlow a broker in the United States arranged a sale of uranium but
billed Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko through its Bermuda affiliate. The court
found common ownership between the two companies unpersuasive in shifting
jurisdiction to the United States.
21. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
22. Id. at 855.
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agency." Why the court waited until it reached clause three to
raise that point is not clear. It is at once apparent that a determination that no commercial activity occurred is dispositive of all
possible claims under section 1605. Thus the limited case law since
the Act was passed has been unable to delineate a clear strategy
in dealing with clause three lawsuits. The court in Edlow, while
addressing the clause three question in terms of common ownership, really disposed of the case on an entirely different issue.U The
court in Novosti dealt with the question by finding no commercial
activity and no contacts, but sidestepped the question of direct
effects. Commentators on the Act have shown a similar diversity
of approach. Some insist on minimum contacts for all actions, 5
while others have argued that the clause applies more to expropriation and antitrust violations involving American sharehold6rs and
any effect on them is sufficient." The legislative history itself,
while charging the entire Act with adherence to minimum contact
theory, also states that clause three must be interpreted in view of
direct effects. It is in light of this confusion over the interpretation
of clause three that the instant case must be considered.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court noted that N.O.C. was clearly a foreign state
as contemplated by the Acts and held that none of the exceptions
to immunity applied. 2 The court pointed out that the only exception with possible application was section 1605(a)(2), clause three,
since there was no direct act in the United States." Next, the court
observed that the legislative history mandated the application of
minimum contact theory." The court then noted that immediately
23.

Id. at 856.

24. 441 F. Supp. at 832.
25. Delaume, Sovereign Immunity in America: A Bicentennial
Accomplishment, 8 J. MAR. L. & COM. 349, 356 (1977); see also Note, Sovereign
Immunity - Limits of Judicial Control, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 429, 439-40 (1977).
26. Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 58, 59 (1978). Von Mehren evaluates the clause in terms of
expropriation cases in the discussion of direct effects.
27. H.R. 1487, supra note 8, at 13.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976) defines a foreign state in part as an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" which includes a separate legal person, a

majority of whose ownership interest is owned by a foreign state, and which is
neither a United States citizen nor a creation of a third nation.
29. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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prior to and during the Yom Kippur war, Libya sought to reduce
its contacts with the United States. The court concluded that even
if Libya were aware that the Bahamian corporations were selling
oil to the United States, and even if the embargo were designed to
directly effect the United States, the commercial dealings had
been outside of any of the protections and privileges of the United
States and thus were lacking in any minimum contacts.2 Having
thus disposed of the breach claims, the court held that the claims
that Libya had deliberately induced N.O.C.'s breach must be dismissed as clearly addressing a public, political act of the sovereign.3 The court observed that Libya's oil policy of the period was
clearly aimed at punishing undesirable conduct.3 4 The court briefly
outlined the history of sovereign immunity as support for its conclusion that "this was not the kind of act to which the exceptions
in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 were meant to apply."" Finally, the court
dismissed the last omnibus claim which attempted "to hold both
Libya and N.O.C. responsible for the entire series of events described. . . from 1968 to the present. ' 38 The court concluded that
this claim essentially turned on the nationalization of the oil industry in Libya and rejected the plea that the court question what
it described as a "quintessentially sovereign act."3
IV.

COMMENT

Considering the potential for uncertainty which section
1605(a)(2) of the Act contains, it is unfortunate that the court in
Carey did not expansively or clearly explain its rationale in reaching what appears to be a correct result. The rationale the court
followed has already been echoed by the district court of the District of Columbia in Upton v. Empire of Iran,3 8 which concerned
the death of two Americans at the airport in Tehran, Iran, and the
subsequent suit for damages against the Iranian state-owned airline. That court, citing Carey, found a lack of minimum contacts
32. Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1953)).
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id. at 1102.

36. Id.The court also noted that even if Libya's actions were not viewed as
sovereign in nature, they constituted at most a tortious interference with contract
rights, a claim specifically excluded from the exceptions of the Act. 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a) (5)(B) (1976).
37. 453 F. Supp. at 1102.

38.

459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978).
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with the United States and therefore declined to except Iran from
immunity." The Upton court, however, further considered the
question of "direct effects" and concluded that the effect within
the United States of the death of two of its citizens abroad was
indirect and thus supported the court's conclusion that immunity
should not be lifted." The court in Carey considered only briefly
and indirectly the question of direct effect 4 and thus missed an
opportunity to clarify the uncertainty surrounding that issue. Considering the legislative mandate that the clause be interpreted
consistently with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, and considering the detail and clarity of the discussion in the
RESTATEMENT, the omission of the Carey court becomes glaring
indeed. In practical terms, however, the court reached a correct
conclusion. A court would be reluctant to consider holding Libya
and its oil agency responsible in the United States for money damages resulting from the Arab oil embargo of 1973. The court alluded
to this when it held that the entire sequence of events indicated a
quintessentially sovereign act, more public and political than private and commercial. In light of the holding in Novosti that agencies engaged in commercial acts may also engage in public acts
immune to challenge, the instant case might have been disposed
of on these grounds alone. By delving half-heartedly into the statutory language, the court appears to have been seeking to rationalize a clear holding rather than sketch in logical, sequential steps
the analysis used in reaching that decision. From Carey and Upton
it can be deduced that in some circumstances this section of the
Act does not lend itself to clear analysis by statutory tests, but
rather must be interpreted broadly. In addition to contacts and
effect, the courts also seem willing to consider the practical effects
of what the plaintiff may be asking the court to do and whether
the court should properly be involved. In this respect the Congress
appears to have been successful in insuring that the courts are not
turned into "small international courts of claims."
Jason Moore Rugo

39. Id. at 266.
40. Id. at 266.
41. 453 F. Supp. at 1101.

